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Prison-Release Reform and American 
Decarceration 
Kevin R. Reitz† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article zeroes in on one significant engine of American 
prison growth that is also a promising instrument of decarcera-
tion reform: the wildly dissimilar mechanisms that exist across 
the states to determine when people sentenced to prison will be 
released.1  
The subject of “prison-release reform” addresses all official 
decision points occurring after the pronouncement of a judicial 
prison sentence that have bearing on the amount of time a par-
ticular defendant will actually serve (time served). To flesh out 
this inquiry for each jurisdiction, we need to ask what degree of 
power over time served is vested in “back-end” officials like pa-
role boards (as opposed to the length-defining force of the judicial 
sentence) and the ways in which those officials have actually 
made use of their powers in individual cases and aggregates of 
cases. For a complete policy analysis, we must also ask how back-
end releasing practices have changed over time and—most im-
portantly of all—what fluctuations in those practices, for good or 
ill, are foreseeable in the future. 
 
†  James Annenberg La Vea Professor of Criminal Procedure, University 
of Minnesota Law School. Copyright © 2020 by Kevin R. Reitz.  
 1. For a broader slate of recommendations that address mass incarcera-
tion as well as “mass punishments” of other forms, see MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING (AM. LAW INST., Forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter MPCS]; Kevin R. 
Reitz & Cecelia M. Klingele, Model Penal Code: Sentencing—Workable Limits 
on Mass Punishment, 48 CRIME & JUST. 255 (2019). The MPCS recommends 
that all states eliminate the discretionary-release powers of their parole boards. 
See MPCS, supra, § 6.11(9)–(10) & cmt. a, app. B (explaining the preference for 
determinate sentencing systems). This Article is addressed primarily to the two-
thirds of states that have not taken this step and are unlikely to do so in the 
near future. 
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This constellation of questions has received little attention 
in contemporary analyses of mass incarceration.2 It is time to 
correct that error.  
The main protagonist of this Article’s narrative is the Amer-
ican parole board, although there are important supporting ac-
tors in some jurisdictions, including corrections officials who ad-
minister good-time or similar credits.3 In most places, paroling 
authorities are the power players. Two-thirds of all states oper-
ate with “indeterminate” prison-release systems in which parole 
boards hold the lion’s share of legal authority over the ultimate 
durations of most prison sentences.4 Their use of that power 
 
 2. In the 1980s and 1990s, Kay Knapp and others argued that state efforts 
to control prison populations and avoid correctional overcrowding were unlikely 
to succeed alongside the arcane and unpredictable prison-release practices of 
parole boards and corrections officials. This belief influenced comprehensive 
sentencing reforms in Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, North Carolina, and 
Kansas, all of which included the abolition of discretionary parole release in 
order to achieve greater predictability in the use of prison resources. See AM. 
BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 32–33 (3d ed. 
1994); Andrew von Hirsch, The Enabling Legislation, in THE SENTENCING COM-
MISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 62, 75 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987); Kay 
A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing Struc-
tures, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 681–84 (1993); Kay A. Knapp, Back to Basics: 
Fundamental Issues in Sentence Reform Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 86, 86–
87 (1998). In the intervening years, however, this mind-set has largely disap-
peared from the debate of incarceration reform. 
 3. Depending on the state, officials with prison-release discretion may in-
clude a variety of decision makers within departments of corrections (e.g., 
prison intake officers, those who administer good-time and earned-time credits, 
disciplinary officers and supervisors, hearing officers, and wardens), judges 
with paroling or other prison-release authority over some cases, boards of par-
dons, governors, and even (but rarely) sentencing commissions. See, e.g., CAL. 
CONST. art. V, § 8 (granting the governor clemency authority); 61 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 4502–4507 (2019) (describing Pennsylvania’s recidivism risk reduction 
incentive, which allows a sentencing judge to impose both a minimum and max-
imum sentence and requires no further review by the parole board once the in-
carcerated person has met the program requirements and served the minimum 
sentence). 
 4. These include Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi (for nonviolent offenders), 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See AM. LAW INST., MODEL PE-
NAL CODE: SENTENCING, REPORT 18–27 (2003) (describing the indeterminate 
sentencing system proposed in the original Model Penal Code, approved in 
1962); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRIS-
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across many cases is a leading determinant of prison population 
size.5 Strikingly, paroling authority is tightly concentrated. In 
most states, parole boards are made up of fewer than a dozen 
people.6 Nationwide, prison policymaking through parole release 
is administered by a total of roughly 350 individuals.7  
Time served is also governed to some extent by prison offi-
cials. Most states, including “determinate” (non-paroling) states, 
allow for good-time, earned-time, or other discounts against min-
imum terms, maximum terms, or both. These are awarded by 
corrections officials based on prisoners’ good conduct, program 
participation, work done in prison, meritorious acts, and so on. 
The classification and application of such credits varies mark-
edly across states.8 For brevity, I will refer to them generically 
as “good-time” credits unless otherwise noted. 
 
ONER REENTRY 66–67 tbl.3.1 (2003); Kevin R. Reitz, The Traditional “Indeter-
minate” Sentencing System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS 270, 274–75 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). 
 5. See Kevin R. Reitz & Edward E. Rhine, Parole Release and Supervision: 
Critical Drivers of American Prison Policy, 3 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 281, 283 
(2020) (estimating that in 2016, two-thirds of prison terms were impacted by 
parole board decisions and policies). 
 6. See Mario A. Paparozzi & Joel M. Caplan, A Profile of Paroling Author-
ities in America: The Strange Bedfellows of Politics and Professionalism, 89 
PRISON J. 401, 412–14 tbl.1 (2009) (identifying forty-three states with parole 
boards of fewer than twelve members). 
 7. See EBONY L. RUHLAND ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, THE CONTINUING LEVERAGE OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES: FIND-
INGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 10 (2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/ 
sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/final_national_parole_survey_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AKG9-RF7P] (reporting a 2013 count of 340 parole board 
members across forty-six states); Paparozzi & Caplan, supra note 6 (reporting 
a 2000–01 total of 347 individuals serving as full- or part-time members of state 
parole boards). 
 8. In many paroling states, good-time credits foreshorten the maximum 
term a prisoner must serve (sometimes called the “mandatory release date”) but 
do not advance the date of first parole-release eligibility. See IOWA CODE 
§ 903A.2(1)(a) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.045 (West 2019); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 15:571.3(A)(1) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-138.1(1) (2019); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 83-1,108(1) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:22(III) (2019) (stating 
credits for good conduct only affect mandatory release date; different rule ap-
plies to “earned time credits”); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803 (McKinney 2019) (stat-
ing credits for good behavior are counted only against maximum term; different 
rule applies to “merit time allowances”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 138(A) (2019). In 
several indeterminate states, good-time credits accelerate parole-release 
eligibility but have no effect on the maximum possible prison stay. See COLO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 17-22.5-301, -403, -405 (2019); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803 (credit-
ing “merit time allowances” against minimum term; different rule applies to 
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If the good-time credits on offer in a determinate state are 
sufficiently generous, it can become difficult to distinguish that 
state from its sister indeterminate states. For example, the “de-
terminate” state of Washington9 allows for “earned-release-time” 
credits that may subtract as much as 50% from the maximum 
prison stays of many nonviolent offenders.10 In Washington, the 
 
credits for good behavior); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4505(c)(2) (2019); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 498.003(a) (West 2019). In still other indeterminate systems, good-
time credits do both of these things; that is, they simultaneously advance the 
date of first parole-release eligibility and reduce prisoners’ maximum terms. See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-7a(a) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 129D(b), (d) 
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 209.4465(7) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-
A:22(IV) (2019) (allowing earned time credits to be subtracted from both mini-
mum and maximum terms; different rule applies to “credits for good conduct”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 811 (2019). Finally, some indeterminate states do not 
provide for good-time credits that subtract in any mathematical fashion from 
prisoners’ minimum or maximum terms. In indeterminate states that eschew 
formal good-time deductions, however, one would expect prisoners’ institutional 
behavior to be taken into account by parole boards when making discretionary 
release decisions. See ALEXIS LEE WATTS ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL 
LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND REVOCATION: 
EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: GEORGIA 8 (2016) 
[hereinafter GEORGIA PAROLE PROFILE], https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/ 
robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/603837_georgia_parole_profile3.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VVZ4-9T3W]; ALEXIS LEE WATTS ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL 
LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND REVOCATION: 
EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: MICHIGAN 4 
(2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/ 
700688_new_michigan_parole_profile3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JWU-Z9A5]; 
ALEXIS LEE WATTS ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: MONTANA 4 (2019), https://robinainstitute 
.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/montana_parole_profile.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NFL-AXVL]; ALEXIS LEE WATTS ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF 
CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND 
REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: 
UTAH 5 (2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/ 
files/701159_new_utah_parole_profile2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/5629-CK4L]. 
 9. Washington abolished discretionary parole release for all cases in con-
junction with the creation of felony sentencing guidelines, which became effec-
tive in 1984. See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PRO-
CEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 124–25 tbl.3.1 (2013); David Boerner & 
Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME & JUST. 
71, 73–85 (2001). 
 10. This formula was introduced in 2003, increasing peak earned-timed al-
lowances that were formerly capped at 33%, thus amounting to a 50% increase 
in the credits potentially available to eligible prisoners. ELIZABETH DRAKE ET 
AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, INCREASED EARNED RELEASE FROM 
PRISON: IMPACTS OF A 2003 LAW ON RECIDIVISM AND CRIME COSTS, REVISED 1 
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decisions of prison officials to bestow, withhold, or forfeit earned-
release credits (suppose, for example, all were withheld) contrib-
ute heavily to the state’s prison rate. 
The American run-up to mass incarceration was achieved 
through uninterrupted growth in nationwide incarceration rates 
from 1972 through year-end 2007 (the “Great Prison Buildup”).11 
This Article hypothesizes that prison-release discretion was one 
of its driving forces: During the thirty-five year buildup period, 
in some years more than others, parole boards across the country 
became increasingly hesitant to release prisoners. They became 
progressively more risk-averse in their decision-making and 
ever more fearful of external scrutiny and condemnation. In-
stead of using their release discretion as often as they had done 
in the earlier twentieth century, parole boards transformed 




-Revised_Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3N5-ZHY2]. This was done in a de-
liberate attempt to reduce the state’s prison population and was later declared 
a success on cost-benefit grounds by the Washington State Institute of Public 
Policy. See id. at 4, 8 (estimating that, during 2003 and 2004, 23% of all prison 
releases in Washington were eligible to receive the heightened amount of 
earned-release credits and, within this group, average time served was sixty-
three days shorter than that for a comparison group assembled from the pre-
reform period). Indeed, Washington’s earned-time reform falls within the gen-
eral family tree of prison-release reforms envisioned by this Article. Yet the 
Washington experiment also serves to illustrate the importance of tracking ac-
tual release practices pre- and post-reform. For meaningful evaluation of the 
success of Washington’s program, I would want to know how many prisoners 
have actually received the newly-available credits and in what quantities—data 
that was unavailable to the WSIPP researchers. See id. at 4 n.12. For example, 
if few prisoners post-reform were awarded any portion of the newly-available 
credits, and awards within the preexisting 33% ceiling remained essentially the 
same as before, then the formal availability of the 50% discount under the new 
regime would have had little measurable importance as of the date of evalua-
tion. Under these circumstances, the reform could be described as the creation 
of a reservoir of unused prison-release discretion that might still (who knows?) 
be used with greater frequency in the future. 
 11. The nationwide state imprisonment rate in 1972 was 84 per 100,000, 
rising more than fivefold to 447 per 100,000 in 2007. See PATRICK A. LANGAN 
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ-111098, 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, 
YEAREND 1925–86, at 11 tbl.1 (1988), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
hspsfiy25-86.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7ES-6CX8]; HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM 
J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 224280, 
PRISONERS IN 2007, at 18 app. tbl.6 (2008), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
p07.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DXZ-KZVU].  
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This narrative runs contrary to the conventional wisdom of 
mass incarceration’s causes. In the United States, there is a ro-
manticized view of parole boards. They are reflexively classified 
as agents of lenity by many academics and criminal-justice pro-
fessionals.12 Parole boards are said to offer “early release,” which 
is seen as an act of grace.13 Some (but not all) historians of parole 
claim that release discretion in past eras operated as a safety 
valve to prevent prison overcrowding.14 If this were reliably the 
case, then getting rid of parole-release discretion would be bad 
for prison-population control. On this reasoning, the determi-
nate sentencing reforms in one-third of the states during the late 
twentieth century—abolishing parole-release discretion for most 
cases—are often cited among the top contributors to the Great 
Prison Buildup.15 
 
 12. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750, 1752 (2012) (describing parole as a holistic appraisal of 
a person for the purpose of accomplishing a retributive ideal, not merely focus-
ing on past behavior to render punishment). 
 13. Indeed, the law in most states is that parole release is an act of grace—
accordingly, there is no “right” to be released. See Kimberly Thomas & Paul 
Reingold, From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due Process Protection for Parole, 
107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 243–44 (2017). 
 14. This is not an airtight historical claim. For a sampling of views that the 
indeterminate prison-release systems of the early- and mid-twentieth century 
were fueling prison population growth, see generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Legal 
Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
25, 34–35 (1964); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 48 (1974); 
SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 120 (1998) (“The tendency of the indeterminate sentence to lengthen prison 
terms became one of the major criticisms of the practice voiced by liberals in the 
1960s.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal 
Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1364–65 n.8 
(1975) (stating that the first modern indeterminate system, created in 1889 in 
Illinois, caused prisoners to serve longer sentences than those serving fixed sen-
tences); Sheldon L. Messinger & Philip E. Johnson, California’s Determinate 
Sentencing Statute: History and Issues (1977), reprinted in THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM 950, 954 (Franklin E. Zimring & Richard S. Frase eds., 1980); Paul 
W. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
528, 531–32, 535 (1958) (citing a study that found time served was 20% longer 
in indeterminate jurisdictions than in systems of “definite” sentences). 
 15. For assertions that determinate sentencing reform was responsible for 
a substantial share of American prison growth during the buildup period, see 
generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERA-
TION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 51–53 (2007); DAVID 
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEM-
PORARY SOCIETY 60–61 (2001); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 49, 56–58 
(1999); EDWARD E. RHINE ET AL., PAROLING AUTHORITIES: RECENT HISTORY 
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As often happens, the conventional wisdom gets it wrong. 
On average, states that maintained discretionary prison-release 
schemes over the prison buildup years experienced greater 
amounts of prison growth than states that abolished discretion-
ary parole release.16 Today, nine of the ten states with the high-
est standing prison rates are those that used indeterminate 
prison-release systems through the entire buildup period, and 
the tenth had been indeterminate for most of that time.17  
Prison populations in determinate states also grew during 
the buildup years from 1972 to 2007, but less than in indetermi-
nate states.18 Over the course of the buildup decades, sixteen 
states abolished parole-release discretion.19 After doing so, only 
three of these saw greater prison growth through 2007 than the 
average indeterminate state.20 This bulk history lacks detail, but 
certain facts are reasonably clear. In the specific context of the 
Great Prison Buildup, indeterminate prison-release systems 
 
AND CURRENT PRACTICE 26–29 (1991); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND 
EUROPE 56–57 (2003); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE 
OF IMPRISONMENT 169–71 (1991); Douglas A. Berman, Exploring the Theory, 
Policy, and Practice of Fixing Broken Sentencing Guidelines, 21 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 182, 183–84 (2009); Alfred Blumstein, Prison Populations: A System Out 
of Control?, 10 CRIME & JUST. 231, 241 (1988); A. Keith Bottomley, Parole in 
Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments, and Prospects for 
the 1990s, 12 CRIME & JUST. 319, 342 (1990); David J. Rothman, More of the 
Same: American Criminal Justice Policies in the 1990s, in PUNISHMENT AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHELDON L. MESSINGER 29, 34 (Thomas 
G. Blomberg & Stanley Cohen eds., 1995); David F. Weisman & Christopher 
Weiss, The Origins of Mass Incarceration in New York State: The Rockefeller 
Drug Laws and the Local War on Drugs, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 73, 76–77 (Steven Raphael & Mi-
chael A. Stoll eds., 2009). 
 16. See infra Figure 8. 
 17. JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 252156, PRISONERS IN 2017, at 11 tbl.6 (2019), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE6A-ZLME]. 
The nine states were Louisiana, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, Mis-
souri, Kentucky, Georgia, and Alabama. The tenth state, Arizona, had an inde-
terminate prison-release system for twenty-two years of the thirty-five-year 
buildup. These two-plus decades were responsible for Arizona’s extraordinarily 
high prison rate. After switching to a determinate system in 1994 and for the 
rest of the buildup years through 2007, Arizona experienced less prison growth 
than the average state still using an indeterminate system. See infra Figure 9. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Figure 9. 
 20. See infra Figure 9. 
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were not associated with low incarceration growth compared 
with other types of sentencing systems. On the contrary, the his-
torical record of discretionary parole-release systems from 1972 
to 2007 suggests that they had a pronounced vulnerability to the 
forces that drove prison expansion across the country.21 
It may seem counterintuitive that parole boards’ power to 
grant “early release” can work in the direction of severity, but 
this is a cognitive illusion.22 To clear our perceptions, we must 
recognize that parole boards’ law-given authority to reduce 
prison-sentence lengths always entails a corresponding power to 
increase prison stays. For example, if a parole board has author-
ity to release a prisoner who has served 25% of the judicial max-
imum sentence, the board’s use of its discretion has the potential 
to shave 75% off the maximum term, yes—but we could just as 
easily say that the board’s discretion not to release could add as 
much as 300% to the minimum term (a quadrupling of the min-
imum). Such breadth of possibility in individual cases, when 
scaled up to many cases, is a major lever of aggregate prison pol-
icy. For example, if we consider all the prisoners in the state who 
are subject to this 75/300 degree of discretion, the board’s use of 
its release-denial authority could swing the size of that portion 
of the state’s prison population across a range of variation of 4:1. 
Aside from the sheer magnitude of their power over prison 
policy, parole boards operate in a low-friction environment 
where great changes in sentencing outcomes can take hold with-
out new legislation, sentencing guidelines, amendment to regu-
lations, variations in prosecutorial practices, court decisions, or 
announced policy changes of any kind. Even record-keeping of 
parole-release decisions is wanting in most states, including rou-
tine data collection. The cumulative actions of parole boards can 
generate large swings in a state’s prison population while hardly 
alerting anyone to the source of the change. 
Although parole boards are powerful ministries of prison 
policy, they are also supremely vulnerable to certain kinds of ex-
ternal pressure. Their members enjoy low professional status, 
high job insecurity, and no insulation from media and political 
 
 21. For an empirical analysis of what those forces may have been, compar-
ing data from all fifty states and many other countries, see Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, 
American Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective: Explaining Trends and 
Variation in the Use of Incarceration, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT 195 (Kevin R. Reitz ed., 2018).  
 22. For many examples of such cognitive misperceptions, see DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 7–8, 27–28, 209–11 (2011). 
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reprisals when a single releasee commits a horrible crime. No 
one pays attention to most of what parole boards do, so they are 
never given credit for parolees who do well or the reductions in 
crime that come along with the successful reintegration of hun-
dreds or thousands of ex-prisoners. Instead, board members are 
held personally accountable only for a tiny number of worst-case 
scenarios in high-profile cases.23 The consequences of a single re-
lease decision gone wrong are part of the lore of the field, even 
 
 23. See, e.g., Larry Fish, Officer’s ’95 Killing Led to a Tougher Pa. Parole 
System, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 6, 2005, at A1 (“Ten years ago, Robert ‘Mudman’ 
Simon won parole from Pennsylvania’s Graterford Prison, where he was serving 
time for second-degree murder, and moved to New Jersey. Within three months, 
he was arrested for shooting and killing a police officer. Since then, Pennsylva-
nia has made its parole system tougher and, most would say, better by setting 
clear criteria for releasing convicts before their maximum sentences are served. 
But it also has helped increase Pennsylvania’s record prison population. Some 
say that it has made it harder for offenders to get out and stay out, and that 
Pennsylvania convicts can expect to serve some of the longest terms in the coun-
try. ‘Mudman Simon put a big chill on the operation of our entire prison system, 
most noticeably in the area of parole,’ said [the] executive director of the Penn-
sylvania Prison Society.”). On the effects of the changes in Pennsylvania’s parole 
system, see Judge: Inmates Are Unfairly Being Denied Parole, PA. L. WKLY., 
Oct. 26, 1998, at 1346 (citing statistics that 77% of prisoners eligible for parole 
release were given parole in the early 1990s before the Mudman case, but this 
had dropped to 44% of eligible prisoners by 1997). On changes in other states, 
see also Dave Altimari & Colin Poitras, Parole an Issue After Cheshire Slayings, 
HARTFORD COURANT, July 27, 2007, at A1 (“[Governor] Rell said she is forming 
a special panel to review not only how [the two killers] were paroled, but also to 
take a look at the entire process of who gets released from state prisons.”); John 
Dannenberg, Systemic Changes Follow Murder of Colorado Prison Director, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (July 10, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/ 
2014/jul/10/systemic-changes-follow-murder-colorado-prison-director [https:// 
perma.cc/6GJV-SURM] (“State Parole Chief Tim Hand was placed on paid ad-
ministrative leave following [Prison Director] Clements’ murder [by a prison 
releasee] and later fired. . . . [T]he state’s prison population has been rising due 
to fewer paroles being granted.”); Beth Schwartzapfel, How Parole Boards Keep 
Prisoners in the Dark and Behind Bars, WASH. POST (July 11, 2015), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-power-and-politics-of-parole-boards/ 
2015/07/10/49c1844e-1f71-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html [https://perma 
.cc/58FS-E8DJ] (“A man the [Massachusetts parole] board had voted unani-
mously to release went on to commit another terrible crime. . . . [W]hen board 
members arrived at work days later, armed troopers escorted them to a confer-
ence room where they found . . . the governor’s chief of staff, distributing resig-
nation letters . . . .”); Christine Stuart, Gov. Rell Bans Parole for Crimes of Vio-
lence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/ 
nyregion/23rell.html [https://perma.cc/GYN4-V3G2] (anticipating Connecticut  
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in states that have not recently experienced a catastrophic case. 
In a 2015 national survey, most parole board chairs nominated 
political vulnerability and pressure toward the “minimization of 
all risk” as one of the most important problems confronting their 
field.24 
American parole boards are sitting ducks when things go 
disastrously wrong. They lack the cover of enforceable decision 
rules or the credibility of a genuine deliberative process. Institu-
tionally they are under-resourced beyond reason.25 They must 
make decisions in minutes rather than hours, any one of which 
could cost them their jobs.26 The combination of great power (in 
one sense) and abject weakness (in another) is a formula for the 
mismanagement of prison policy. 
When inquiring into the origins of mass incarceration, the 
active parole boards in two-thirds of the states should have a 
place of honor. Instead, they are too often seen as casualties of 
the surge toward prison population growth and not one of its 
makers. This is an error with forward-looking policy conse-
quences. For example, how should we evaluate claims that state 
decarceration reforms should include a restoration of parole 
boards’ releasing authority where it has been limited or re-
moved? For some, the answer is that a return to indeterminacy 
 
governor’s changes in parole-release procedure, a House spokesperson promised 
“to make sure that the Corrections Department had the resources it needed to 
deal with what he described as a ‘dramatic increase in population over the next 
few months’”). 
 24. RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 7. During the buildup years, sixteen states 
and the federal government passed legislation abolishing parole-release discre-
tion for the vast majority of prisoners. In order of abolition, these were Maine, 
California, Indiana, Illinois, New Mexico, Minnesota, Florida, Washington, Or-
egon, Delaware, Kansas, Arizona, North Carolina, Virginia, Ohio, and Wiscon-
sin. The federal system discontinued discretionary parole release in 1984. See 
PETERSILIA, supra note 4. Whether one favors these “determinate sentencing 
reforms” or not, they contributed to a sense of wariness and embattlement 
within surviving parole boards. Id. at 65–75. 
 25. See MPCS, supra note 1, § 6.13 cmt. g. 
 26. See id. at app. B at 900 (citing studies that found parole boards had 
between three and twenty minutes to decide each case). 
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is a good idea.27 For me, there should be a caveat: “Not without 
dramatic improvements on the paroling systems of the past.”28 
Because of their concentrated power, parole boards and 
other releasing agencies are promising sites for decarceration re-
form.29 Parole boards in a number of states have already shifted 
toward greater generosity in their release decisions—sometimes 
under pressure from the political branches to reduce prison 
costs.30 This may be a fruitful pathway to reduced prison rates, 
as long as the political winds are blowing in the direction of 
decarceration. We must cast our thoughts to the longer term, 
however, when current sensibilities of de-escalation may give 
way once again to a national wave of punitivism. This is not sure 
to happen, of course, but it would be naïve to put it outside the 
realm of reasonable foreseeability.31 If we fail to reassess the tra-
ditional American machinery of prison-release discretion now, 
many states will remain just as helpless in future decades to re-
sist pressures toward runaway prison growth as they were in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
The overriding goal of this Article is to convince the reader 
that its subject matter is important. An awareness of the vicissi-
tudes of prison-release discretion is essential to a basic under-
standing of mass incarceration and to the formulation of long-
term decarceration strategies. The creation of such awareness is 
no small task, however. The Article deals with areas of inquiry 
that have been grossly neglected by researchers and practition-
ers. It may be fair to say that prison-release discretion is the only 
 
 27. See Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of 
the Original MPC Sentencing Provisions, 61 U. FLA. L. REV. 709, 724 (2009); 
Peggy Burke & Michael Tonry, Successful Transition and Reentry for Safer 




 28. See Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & 
JUST. 279, 293–95 (2017) (discussing such proposed changes as limiting the 
scope of the boards’ discretion, establishing blanket parole eligibility when pris-
oners have served fifteen years, and a presumption of release at first eligibility). 
 29. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF MASS INCAR-
CERATION (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript ch. 7 at 24–25). 
 30. See infra Part V. 
 31. See Kevin R. Reitz, American Exceptionalism in Crime and Punish-
ment: Broadly Defined, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT, supra note 21, at 1, 29 (arguing that “pinning reformist optimism to a 
new ‘low plateau’ of American crime rates is not a wholly defensible way to plan 
for the future”). 
  
2752 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2741 
 
important engine of mass incarceration that has gone largely un-
seen. 
To this purpose, the remainder of the Article assembles evi-
dence of the centrality of prison-release discretion in the past 
and future of American incarceration policy. 
I.  TIME SERVED AS A FACTOR IN AMERICAN PRISON 
GROWTH   
Empirical analyses of American prison growth have focused 
on two causal mechanisms. A jurisdiction’s prison population—
and its prison rate—are a function of (1) the number of people 
admitted to its prison system, and (2) the amount of time they 
each serve once they get there.32 Research shows that increased 
admissions and longer terms of stay were both responsible for 
America’s prison buildup in about equal measures through the 
1980s.33 During the 1990s—the decade of most rapid expan-
sion—the National Research Council estimated that increases in 
time served were responsible for more than 60% of incarceration 
growth across the states.34 
Without further research, we cannot say whether prison-re-
lease discretion was the main source of lengthening prison terms 
during the buildup period. While prison-release discretion is an 
important determinant of time served, it is not the only factor. 
Waves of harsh legislation probably had large effects, too. For 
example, many offenses now carry no parole-release eligibility, 
even in states with indeterminate release structures for most in-
mates.35 Life-without-parole sentences cannot be shortened by 
parole boards or credits for good behavior. Some prison sentences 
now reach parole eligibility only after long “minimum” periods 
such as forty or fifty years, essentially unheard of before the 
1980s.36 People serving extremely long sentences tend to accu-
mulate in prison populations, so they contribute heavily to state 
 
 32. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 50–52 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). 
 33. Id. at 53. 
 34. Id. at 54–55. The Council noted that, because of methodological limita-
tions, its estimates “should be viewed as a lower bound on the increase in time 
served.” Id. at 53.  
 35. MARC MAUER & ASHLEY NELLIS, THE MEANING OF LIFE: THE CASE FOR 
ABOLISHING LIFE SENTENCES 9–10 (2018). 
 36. See id. 
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prison rates. For developments like these, we cannot blame pa-
role boards or other back-end decision makers. 
As a driver of prison rates, prison-release discretion oper-
ates most powerfully in run-of-the-mill cases that are governed 
by a state’s standard release formulas. These are the rules of the 
road for the majority of people who enter American prison sys-
tems. For the mass of offenders, judicial sentences usually estab-
lish minimum and maximum possible terms that draw fixed bor-
ders on the scope of downstream release discretion.37 As 
discussed below, these broadly-spaced bookends are generally 
less determinative of actual time served than the discretionary 
decisions of parole boards and other prison-release authorities. 
For the mine run of prison sentences in indeterminate states, it 
is fair to say that parole boards have more to say about time 
served than sentencing judges. 
The exact contribution of discretionary-release denials to 
state prison populations cannot be estimated without granular 
research that no one has yet performed. Napkin estimates can 
be drawn from the big-picture statistics we have in hand, but 
that is all. If the National Research Council is correct that in-
creases in time served were a leading factor in the buildup to 
mass incarceration—responsible for 60% or more of the buildup 
in the 1990s—we can speculate how much of that 60% was the 
product of back-end decisions.38 The results could be eye-catch-
ing. For example, even if only one-third of the growth in time 
served across the 1990s was attributable to shifting practices of 
prison-release authorities (fewer releases, more denials), then 
20% of all prison growth during that critical decade was driven 
by officials invested with prison-release discretion. That is a big 
chunk of the mass incarceration problem. 
Also, agencies with prison-release discretion often have a 
degree of control over the number of prison admissions. In most 
states, parole boards make decisions concerning revocations 
back to prison of parolees who have violated their terms of su-
pervision. In recent years, parole revocations have added up to 
about 28% of all prison admissions nationwide.39 During the 
 
 37. See Reitz, supra note 4, at 274. 
 38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 39. TIMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, NCJ 184735, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 1990–2000, at 13 
tbl.19 (2001), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tsp00.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ZQ73-BFKU]. 
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prison boom years, that figure reached 35%.40 For now, however, 
this aspect of parole board power can be set to one side. The focus 
of this Article is prison-release discretion, not reincarceration 
discretion.41 However, it is relevant to note that every person re-
incarcerated via revocation creates the need for a later release—
or “re-release”—determination. In most states, re-release discre-
tion reverts back to the jurisdiction of parole boards and other 
agencies with influence over first-release decisions.42 This intro-
duces layers of complexity into the question of “how long” a given 
prison sentence really is. The full calculation of time served in 
an individual case must include the period between admission 
and first release, plus any additional incarcerations on subse-
quent revocations. 
II.  THE SCOPE OF PRISON-RELEASE DISCRETION   
As a matter of formal legal authority, the amount of control 
over prison population size that is ceded to American parole 
boards is breathtaking. Because every state is different and pa-
role release is nowhere a subject of great visibility, it requires 
some digging to appreciate the stakes involved. To illustrate, 
this section will describe the general rules of release discretion 
in Georgia, Iowa, and Colorado.43 
 
 40. See BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 17, at 13 tbl.7; HUGHES ET AL., 
supra note 39. 
 41. Others have emphasized the great influence that parole officers and pa-
role boards have over prison populations and their associated costs through 
their use of the revocation process. See MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRIS-
ONS: HOW TO REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION 132 (2005) (“Vir-
tually no one in government can spend money like a parole officer [through de-
cisions to trigger the revocations process]. . . . [T]he decisions of a single parole 
officer can mean that a given state has to spend over a million dollars per year 
on prisons.”); Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015 (2013) (discussing both parole and proba-
tion supervision as feeders of incarceration populations through revocations). 
 42. See EDWARD E. RHINE ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, LEVERS OF CHANGE IN PAROLE RELEASE AND REVOCATION 4, 6 
(2019), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/ 
parole_landscape_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PDT-QBL4]. 
 43. The schematics presented in this section and the next address only the 
period between prison admission and first release. An attempt to create timeline 
diagrams that incorporate parole revocations, reincarcerations, and re-re-
leases—all of which could occur multiple times in a single case—would require 
greater thought and creativity than I have so far been able to devote to the sub-
ject. 
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A. GEORGIA 
In Georgia, the law for most cases grants parole boards au-
thority to release after a prisoner has served 33% of the maxi-
mum judicial sentence.44 This could be quantified as a 67/200 
release-denial system (that is, the parole board has the power to 
release with 67% of the maximum still to be served or to delay 
release until time served is triple the minimum sentence 
(+200%)).45 For cases within its jurisdiction and subject to these 
rules, the Georgia parole board’s actions can vary the size of the 
prison population by as much as 3:1. For example, suppose that 
the statewide prison rate for those subject to the 67/200 prison-
release rules would be 100 per 100,000 if every prisoner were 
released at first eligibility. If, at the other extreme, the board 
were to hold all 67/200 prisoners for their entire maximum 
terms, the state’s prison rates for the same group of offenders 
would be 300 per 100,000.46 
A diagram of the Georgia system is shown in Figure 1. The 
black portion of the timeline represents the percentage of the ju-
dicial maximum sentence that must be served—or the “mini-
mum sentence,” while the gray stretch of the timeline shows the 
amount of potential time served that is subject to the parole 
board’s discretion to release or deny release. 
  
 
 44. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45(b)(1)–(2) (2019); GEORGIA PAROLE PRO-
FILE, supra note 8. 
 45. In Georgia, as opposed to many other states, the Department of Correc-
tions has no authority to change the 67/200 formula in individual cases. Good-
time awards are instead used to recommend that the parole board grant earlier 
releases within their discretionary window. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-101(d); 
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 125-3-7-.01(2) (2020); GEORGIA PAROLE PROFILE, supra 
note 8 (“Though [performance incentive] credits [awarded by the Department of 
Corrections] may hasten parole release, they do not reduce either the minimum 
parole eligibility date or the maximum length of a sentence.”). 
 46. Actual prison rates under the 67/200 system, or any other mathemati-
cal release formula, will depend on how many people have been sentenced to 
prison who are subject to those rules, the maximum terms those prisoners have 
received, and the population of the state. In the hypothetical case above, if we 
assume a state with a general population of 5,000,000 people, there must be 
15,000 people in prison on any given day to produce a prison rate of 300 per 
100,000 under the scenario above in which the parole board releases no one. In 
the same state, if the parole board released everyone at first eligibility, the 
prison population would be 5,000. 
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In Georgia, as in most other indeterminate states, the parole 
board’s release-denial decisions are “discretionary” in an almost 
unencumbered sense of the term. Their rulings are not subject 
to enforceable rules, and the board’s decisions are effectively 
immune from appeal in most instances.47 Thus, in Georgia, the 
board’s power within the 67/200 framework is, for practical pur-
poses, unassailable.48 
Georgia prisoners cannot advance their release eligibility 
dates or shorten their maximum terms through the accumula-
tion of good-time credits. In Georgia, the accrual of good-time 
 
 47. See Reitz, supra note 4, at 283–85 (surveying state laws). 
 48. Many states delegate greater prison-release discretion to back-end offi-
cials than Georgia. For example, in Arkansas, many prisoners who earn the 
maximum available good end time credits become eligible for release after serv-
ing one-sixth of the traditional maximum term. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-
614(c)(3)(B) (2019). In such cases, the mathematical measurement of the parole 
board’s release-denial discretion is 83/500. In New Jersey, the parole handbook 
explains that, for ordinary prisoners who are serving a ten-year sentence, first 
release eligibility occurs after twenty-three months and five days. See N.J. 
STATE PAROLE BD., THE PAROLE BOOK: A HANDBOOK ON PAROLE PROCEDURES 
FOR ADULT AND YOUNG ADULT INMATES 35 (5th ed. 2012), https://www.state.nj 
.us/parole/docs/AdultParoleHandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/45A6-AZAU]. This 
is roughly an 80/422 release-denial formula. Even these examples, however, fall 
short of the outer extremes of American prison-release indeterminacy. In sev-
eral states, inmates are admitted to prison with no minimum terms. In theory—
although probably not routinely in practice—they may be released by the parole 
board on the day of their arrival. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-669(1) (2019); IOWA 
CODE § 902.3 (2019). 
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credits is treated as a non-binding factor to be taken into account 
by the parole board when making release decisions.49 Prison of-
ficials’ awards of credits are not meaningless if they sway the 
boards’ decisions, but they do not alter the formal mathematical 
scope of the board’s 67/200 release-denial discretion. 
B. IOWA 
In Iowa, the law of prison release for most prisoners is an 
entirely different model. An ordinary prisoner is admitted with 
a maximum prison term but no minimum.50 Subject to the parole 
board’s choices, the inmate could serve anywhere from 0 to 100% 
of the judicial maximum sentence.51 Figure 2 depicts this ar-
rangement. There is no black segment in the figure’s timeline, 
which indicates that there is no minimum amount of time served 
that is dictated by the judicial sentence. In theory, if the parole 
board were to release every prisoner at the moment they were 
admitted, the prison rate for cases within the board’s jurisdiction 
would be 0 per 100,000. Or, at the opposite extreme, the board 
could hold everyone for their full maximum terms. The prison 
rate for board-governed cases would then be as high as the judi-
cial maximum sentences could possibly produce.  
 
 49. GEORGIA PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 8. 
 50. See IOWA CODE § 902.3; ALEXIS LEE WATTS ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF 
CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND 
REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: 
IOWA 8 (2016) [hereinafter IOWA PAROLE PROFILE], https://robinainstitute.umn 
.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/605447_iowa_parole_profile.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/59DU-5WJ5] (“[A]side from mandatory sentences/mandatory 
minimum sentences imposed for certain specific crimes, there are no minimum 
sentences. Thus, most Iowa inmates are technically eligible for parole upon in-
carceration.” (footnote omitted)). 
 51. See IOWA PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 50 (discussing parole board dis-
cretion). 
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This is not a full description of the basic Iowa setup, how-
ever. The ordinary prisoner in the state can earn as much as 1.2 
days of good-time credit for every day served with good behav-
ior.52 These credits are subtracted from the judicial maximum 
sentence.53 If the Department of Corrections chooses to award all 
possible good-time credits to a particular prisoner, then that per-
son must be released after serving no more than 45% of the judi-
cial maximum term. The parole board still has unaltered discre-
tion to release the prisoner earlier than the 45% mark.54 But on 
these facts, the board has lost 55% of its parole-denial discretion 
to hold the offender for the original maximum term set by the 
judicial sentence. A diagram of the Iowa prison-release timeline 
in such a case of truncated discretion is shown in Figure 3. 
  
 
 52. IOWA CODE § 903A.2(1)(a); see also IOWA PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 
50. 
 53. See IOWA CODE § 903A.2(1)(a); IOWA PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 50. 
 54. See generally IOWA PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 50, at 8–9 (discussing 
criteria for parole release decisions and the absence of parole release guide-
lines). 
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Iowa is an instance of a powerful department of corrections 
that wields a degree of authority over time served rivaling the 
parole board’s. In configuring all the different ways a system like 
this could operate in practice, the department’s and the board’s 
prison-release discretions interact with each other in complex 
ways. For instance, if the Department of Corrections nearly al-
ways dispensed full good-time credits to inmates, the cutback of 
the parole board’s authority would be very substantial. On the 
other hand, if the department virtually never awarded any good 
time credits to anyone, the parole board’s release-denial discre-
tion would remain as depicted in Figure 2. Who knows how this 
actually works out? Year-by-year, the effective division of au-
thority in Iowa probably varies a great deal. 
C. COLORADO 
Colorado is another state with a powerful corrections de-
partment with the ability to expand or contract the parole 
board’s authority, but in an entirely different way than in Iowa. 
In the ordinary felony case, an offender enters prison with no  
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possibility but to serve the full judicial maximum sentence—un-
less something changes.55 Upon admission, the parole board has 
0% discretion over time served.56 Figure 4 depicts the situation. 
 
This formula is not meant to last, however. Colorado prison-
ers can earn fifteen days of good time for every month they serve 
in good standing.57 As they accumulate credits, their maximum 
sentences do not change, but the possibility of parole release 
springs into existence and moves backwards to earlier and ear-
lier dates.58 Figure 4 thus represents the release-eligibility situ-
ation on the day a prisoner is admitted—a situation that will 
persist as long as the prisoner earns no good-time credits 
throughout his stay. 
If a prisoner earns all available good-time credits, however, 
he becomes eligible for release at the 50% mark of his judicially-
 
 55. KEVIN R. REITZ ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: COLORADO 8 (2016) [hereinafter 
COLORADO PAROLE PROFILE], https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/ 
robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/602501_colorado_legal_parole_profile_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6DDD-296Q]. 
 56. See id. 
 57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-301 (2019); COLORADO PAROLE PROFILE, su-
pra note 55. 
 58. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-403; see also COLORADO PAROLE PRO-
FILE, supra note 55. 
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imposed maximum term.59 Thus, with the prerequisite decisions 
by corrections officials, the parole board can gain as much as 
50/100 release-denial discretion. To complicate matters a bit fur-
ther, corrections officials in Colorado also have authority to 
award earned-time credits to prisoners who participate in prison 
programs, which are added on top of good-time credits.60 If pris-
oners receive both discounts in their full amounts, their date of 
first parole-release eligibility moves all the way back to the 33% 
mark of the maximum term,61 as shown in Figure 5. This now 
resembles the 67/200 formula Georgia uses automatically for 
most prisoners, as depicted in Figure 1, but in Colorado there are 
many preliminary steps to getting there. 
  
 
 59. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-403; see also id. § 17-22.5-401 (“The gen-
eral assembly hereby declares that if any inmate does not demonstrate positive 
behavior during incarceration, such inmate should be required to serve out the 
full sentence imposed upon such inmate. If any inmate does demonstrate posi-
tive behavior during incarceration, such inmate should be considered for release 
from incarceration prior to the end of the full sentence imposed upon him.”); 
COLORADO PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 55. 
 60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-405; see also COLORADO PAROLE PROFILE, 
supra note 55 (discussing the difference between good time and earned time). 
 61. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 17-22.5-302, -405. 
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Colorado has a number of prison cases that are subject to 
much greater degrees of prison-release discretion than shown in 
Figures 4 and 5. Many classes of sex offenders receive highly in-
determinate prison sentences, such as one year to life, two years 
to life, or four years to life.62 These people enter prison with es-
tablished release-eligibility dates that are not dependent on 
earned credits of any kind, but the parole board has sweeping 
release-denial discretion.63 There is no mechanism by which the 
maximum ceiling of life imprisonment can be reduced, so the 
board’s parole-denial discretion always extends across the re-
mainder of the prisoner’s life.64 Prison population size in Colo-
rado for those serving such sentences is overwhelmingly within 
the parole board’s control. 
The examples above are merely illustrations of the scope 
and power of prison-release discretion to affect time served, 
prison populations, and prison rates in the two-thirds of Ameri-
can states that use indeterminate sentencing systems. In many 
such states, the parole board is the chief repository of such au-
thority, while in other cases there is a complex sharing of prison-
release power between parole boards and corrections depart-
ments. What is consistent in the illustrations above is that the 
combined discretionary powers of back-end officials over time ac-
tually served after the judicial pronouncement of a prison sen-
tence is enormous. Based on the sheer mathematics of prison-
release discretion, we would expect these officials to be largely 
responsible for a state’s prison rate at any point in time. 
III.  SLIPPAGE VERSUS STICKINESS 
One key characteristic of parole-release authority is that it 
is a low-friction mechanism for the production of large changes 
in prison policy, even in short amounts of time.65 A state’s prison 
 
 62. See id. § 18-1.3-1004 (stating that sex offenders shall be sentenced to 
“an indeterminate term of at least the minimum of the presumptive range spec-
ified in section 18-1.3-401 for the level of offense committed and a maximum of 
the sex offender’s natural life”); id. § 18-1.3-401 (defining the minimum pre-
sumptive sentences for felonies based on classification). 
 63. See COLORADO PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 55 (“For most felonies, 
prisoners become eligible for discretionary parole release after they have served 
50 percent of the sentence imposed by the court.”). 
 64. See id. (discussing life sentences and eligibility for release). 
 65. See supra Part II for discussion of parole-release authority through case 
studies of Georgia, Iowa, and Colorado. 
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policy as determined by its parole board can turn on a dime with-
out any changes in law or in the behavior of officials (other than 
the parole board) in the prosecution and sentencing system. Just 
as importantly, parole boards’ release patterns can drift signifi-
cantly over longer periods of time—say, a decade or more—with-
out any formal changes in the law of sentencing or prison re-
lease, but with large ramifications for the state’s prison 
population. 
In contrast, determinate sentencing structures tend to be 
stickier. Dramatic changes in prison policy require legislation, 
amendments to sentencing guidelines, or some other coordinat-
ing force that can alter the sentencing practices of judges or cor-
rections officials en masse across the state. A review of the 
prison-release rules in Minnesota66 and Virginia67 will illustrate 
the relatively fixed relationship that can exist in determinate 
systems between judicially-pronounced prison sentences and the 
amount of time actually served on those sentences. 
A. MINNESOTA 
In Minnesota, most people begin a prison sentence with a 
presumptive release date marked at two-thirds of the maximum 
sentence imposed by the court.68 Release may be postponed only 
if “the defendant commits [a] disciplinary offense in prison that 
results in the imposition of a disciplinary confinement period.”69 
A disciplinary confinement period is a delayed sanction that is 
tacked on as “extended incarceration” to a prisoner’s former pre-
sumptive release date.70 Thus, if a prisoner is admitted with a 
 
 66. See infra Part III.A. 
 67. See infra Part III.B. 
 68. See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2019) (“When a felony offender is 
sentenced to a fixed executed sentence for an offense committed on or after Au-
gust 1, 1993, the executed sentence consists of two parts: (1) a specified mini-
mum term of imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence; 
and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that is equal to one-third 
of the executed sentence.”). 
 69. See id., subd. 2; see also Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 
2007) (“[A]n inmate’s term of imprisonment can be extended if the inmate com-
mits any disciplinary offenses while in prison. Such extensions can result in the 
inmate serving as much as the entire executed sentence in prison.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 70. See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICIES, DIRECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS 
MANUAL § 303.010 (2020) (defining “extended incarceration”). The penalty ei-
ther extends the imprisonment period or prevents the accumulation of addi-
tional good-time credits. Id.  
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presumptive release date of January 1, 2025, a disciplinary pen-
alty of six months of extended incarceration would push back the 
expected release date to July 1, 2025. At the extreme, the accu-
mulation of disciplinary violations and confinement periods can 
postpone a prisoner’s release to the full judicially-designated 
maximum.71 
In essence, Minnesota operates with a “bad-time” system, in 
which the minimum length of stay can be extended by as much 
as 50% if the requisite determinations are made by the Depart-
ment of Corrections. This configuration is diagrammed in Figure 
6. In mathematical measurement, Minnesota has a 33/50 re-
lease-denial system for the majority of prisoners. 
This mathematical descriptor tells us little, however, about 
how release decisions actually play out in practice. As far as we 
know simply from a review of statutory law, the powers of the 
 
 71. See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 2. For prisoners released at first eligi-
bility, the remaining one-third of their judicial sentence is served on community 
supervision. If a prisoner’s release date is pushed back for disciplinary infrac-
tions, however, the period of postrelease supervision is proportionately short-
ened. As in many other states, a Minnesota prisoner who “maxes out” receives 
no supervision or aftercare following release. The new Model Penal Code: Sen-
tencing disapproves of this common arrangement. See MPCS, supra note 1, 
§ 6.13(5) (“The length of term of postrelease supervision shall be independent of 
the length of the prison term, served or unserved, and shall be determined by 
the court with reference to the purposes [of such supervision].”). 
  
2020] PRISON-RELEASE REFORM 2765 
 
Minnesota Department of Corrections could be exercised honor-
ably or arbitrarily. There is no way to tell simply by looking at 
the technical design of the system.72 If we assume an honorable 
and restrained assessment of bad-time penalties, then the “time-
served discretion” held by corrections officials is in practice 
legally-encumbered by such things as defined decisional criteria, 
required adjudication procedures, and the necessity of credible 
proof of the facts of each case.73 On the other hand, experience 
teaches that the administration of good-time credits and the like 
can be shoddy and ill-motivated in some American prisons.74 If 
we assume a corrupt process in Minnesota in which prison offi-
cials treat inmates with unmitigated punitiveness, then we 
could hardly say that corrections officials’ release authority has 
been hemmed in by effective substantive or procedural con-
straints. Indeed, a rogue corrections department might grab for 
itself more de facto release-denial power—within the mathemat-
ically-circumscribed zone of possibility—than the typical parole 
board exercises in an indeterminate system.75 
As it happens, there is reason to think that Minnesota’s pre-
sumption of release at two-thirds of the maximum term is hon-
ored in most cases. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated 
 
 72. This is unlike Colorado’s system, which has established statutory prin-
ciples and criteria for parole release decisions, as well as parole release guide-
lines. See COLORADO PAROLE PROFILE, supra note 55, at 8–10. 
 73. Within mathematical limits, we should have a way of recognizing that 
a discretionary power that is meaningfully confined by rules, norms, and proce-
dures is a “smaller” discretion than when a decision maker exercises free-wheel-
ing power to make any decision it wants. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3–4 (1969) (concluding that 
in order to “minimize injustice from exercise of discretionary power,” we must 
determine the “optimum degree [of discretionary power] . . . in each set of cir-
cumstances”). In the context of decisions concerning time served in prison, this 
would call for a qualitative model of discretionary prison-release power that no 
one has yet developed. 
 74. See James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 217, 234–35, 269–70 (1982) (“[Good time is] subject to more abuse 
because prison officials cannot help but be tempted to use good time to reinforce 
their institutional authority and interests, as they define them. Therefore, good 
time should be abolished.”). 
 75. Procedural constraints on prison disciplinary actions are usually quite 
low. However poorly-regulated and non-transparent the parole-release process 
may be in most states, systems of good-time and bad-time allocation tend to be 
even further below radar. Id. at 270 (“If good time is retained, it is vital to limit 
the types of infractions for which forfeitures can be imposed, the amount of time 
that can be taken for any single violation, and the amount of a prisoner’s time 
that is vulnerable to forfeiture at all.”). 
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that the extension of incarceration beyond the presumptive re-
lease date should be regarded as a serious matter with high 
threshold conditions. In its 2005 decision Carrillo v. Fabian, the 
court emphasized that there is a “presumption” a prisoner will 
be released at the two-thirds mark.76 The Carrillo court charac-
terized the postponement of a prisoner’s release date as “a sig-
nificant departure from the basic conditions of the inmate’s sen-
tence” and went on to hold that, “under the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution, [a prisoner] . . . has a pro-
tected liberty interest in his [presumptive] . . . release date that 
triggers a right to procedural due process before that date can be 
extended.”77 
In 2017, I asked the Minnesota Department of Corrections 
to supply me with any data they had on hand that would show 
whether most prisoners were being released on or close to their 
presumptive release dates. Among all releasees in fiscal year 
2017, the department reported that 63% had been released “on 
or before their actual projected release date.”78 Most of the re-
maining 37% were late releasees, although a small number were 
prisoners who had been serving indeterminate sentences.79 The 
department provided data on the length of extended incarcera-
tion periods for about 10% of the late releasees (leaving quite a 
few cases unaccounted for). For that small group, the average 
amount of extended incarceration was between one and two 
weeks.80 
We can say the following about Minnesota’s prison-release 
system with a low-to-acceptable degree of confidence: In practice, 
the state’s back-end releasing authorities wield dramatically 
less influence over prison population size than that routinely ex-
ercised by parole boards (often in combination with departments 
of corrections) in indeterminate systems. First, officials with re-
lease discretion in Minnesota have less mathematical scope in 
 
 76. Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 771–72 (Minn. 2005) (“[U]nder Min-
nesota’s current sentencing scheme, there is a presumption from the moment 
that a court imposes and explains the sentence that the inmate will be released 
from prison on a certain date—and that presumption is overcome only if the 
inmate commits a disciplinary offense.”).  
 77. Id. at 773. 
 78. Memorandum from the Cent. Office of Minn. Dep’t of Corr. to author 
(Nov. 22, 2017) (on file with author). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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which to act (under the state’s 33/50 formula) than in indetermi-
nate states where parole boards routinely hold the power to tri-
ple or quadruple minimum sentences. Second, back-end releas-
ing authority in Minnesota is subject to substantive constraints 
that simply do not exist in most paroling jurisdictions. Decisions 
to prolong prison stays are not freely taken. The available evi-
dence suggests that prisoners’ presumptive release dates are 
honored in most instances and periods of extended incarceration 
are not terribly long. All of this means that, when a judge im-
poses a prison sentence in Minnesota, the judge (and everyone 
else) knows within a reasonable margin of error what the actual 
time served under that sentence will be. 
One side effect of Minnesota’s system design is that large 
changes in prison-release practices cannot easily occur without 
formal amendments of the generally-applicable positive law 
such as the overall statutory framework, sentencing guidelines, 
controlling judicial precedent, or the rules, procedures, and prac-
tices attendant to prison discipline.81 It would go too far to say 
that the amount of time served for particular classes of judicial 
sentences is “set in stone” in Minnesota, but there is far less play 
in the system than in paroling states. It is hard to imagine a 
large surge in the Minnesota prison population that would be 
attributable to low-visibility slippage in back-end releasing prac-
tices. 
 
 81. To be sure, drastic changes in the culture of the Department of Correc-
tions could also make a big difference. Imagine that, in week one, corrections 
officials throughout Minnesota are careful stewards of the law and almost never 
extend prisoners’ terms in the absence of persuasive evidence of serious miscon-
duct. Beginning in week two, however, a far different outlook sets in. Prison 
officials “go rogue” statewide and begin to hand out bad-time extensions on a 
whim to large numbers of prisoners. Indeed, they do so often enough that aver-
age expected terms of stay are now thrown close to the limits of judicial maxi-
mum sentences. Such a sharp transition in institutional behavior would have a 
big effect on the state’s prison population before too long—and the impact would 
be in the same ballpark as what parole boards are capable of doing in indeter-
minate jurisdictions. However, this is a practical risk that is different-in-kind 
from the potentiality for swift change that is ever-present in paroling states. In 
indeterminate systems, parole boards need not dive off the cliff into lawless be-
havior to exert extreme leverage on prison policy. For example, a single phone 
call from the governor might do the trick. 
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B. VIRGINIA 
Virginia’s prison-release system, in its formal architecture, 
is even more determinate than Minnesota’s. As Figure 7 indi-
cates, most felony offenders sent to prison in Virginia must serve 
at least 85% of their maximum sentences as imposed by the 
court. Prisoners can earn good-time credits that allow release 
sooner than the full maximum term, but these are available at a 
modest rate of only four and a half days per month.82 
 
Mathematically, this can be described as a 15/17 prison-re-
lease system—possibly the most determinate of any current 
state system. In Virginia, a judge’s prison sentence dominates in 
importance any discretion held at the back end of the system. No 
matter what expectation a sentencing judge may hold for a de-
fendant’s actual date of release, it is impossible for the judge to 
be disappointed by a margin of more than 15 to 17%. 
Arguably, from a prison policy perspective, the most im-
portant number in Virginia’s determinate prison-release system 
is the low ceiling on releasing officials’ capacity to push prison 
populations upward. For example, taking the group of prisoners 
subject to the 15/17 rule, let us first suppose that everyone will 
earn all available good-time credits. Let us further assume that, 
under these conditions, the statewide prison rate for inmates in 
this group would rest at 100 per 100,000. If we then change our 
 
 82. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-202.2–.3 (2019). 
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assumptions to imagine that the corrections department with-
holds all good-time credits from everyone, the prison rate for the 
group would grow only to 117 per 100,000. 
What is the vulnerability of a system like Virginia’s to un-
controlled prison growth due to swift or prolonged slippage in the 
behavior of back-end releasing officials? Compared to states like 
Georgia, Iowa, and Colorado, it is very low indeed. Under Vir-
ginia’s current system, if we were to see dramatic increases in 
average amounts of time served for specified types of cases, the 
most likely cause would be changes in the lengths of prison terms 
pronounced in court. We would be on firm ground to aim policy 
scrutiny at front-end actors such as legislatures, sentencing com-
missions, prosecutors, and judges in producing such results. 
IV.  WHICH PRISON-RELEASE SYSTEMS WERE 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOST AND LEAST PRISON-RATE 
GROWTH DURING THE GREAT BUILDUP PERIOD?   
We now turn to the actual prison-growth history of states 
using different types of sentencing and prison-release systems 
during the buildup years. Research suggests that determinate-
release systems tended to experience the least amount of prison 
growth, especially in states that had also adopted judicial sen-
tencing guidelines for the regulation of front-end sentencing dis-
cretion.83 One way to test this possibility is to classify states ac-
cording to their “sentencing system types” and then trace their 
 
 83. See David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, State Prison Populations and 
Their Growth, 1971–1991, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 615, 638 (2001) (“Contrary to pop-
ular opinion, the adoption of determinate sentencing legislation did not increase 
imprisonment rates; it moderately reduced them.”); David Jacobs & Jason T. 
Carmichael, The Politics of Punishment Across Time and Space: A Pooled Time-
Series Analysis of Imprisonment Rates, 80 SOC. FORCES 61, 81 (2001) (“[D]eter-
minate sentencing legislation reduces the size of incarcerated populations.”); 
Kevin B. Smith, The Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations 
of Incarceration Rates, 66 J. POL. 925, 933 tbl.1 (2004) (reporting statistically 
significant correlation between determinate sentencing laws and lower state in-
carceration rates from 1980 to 1995); Don Stemen & Andres F. Rengifo, Policies 
and Imprisonment: The Impact of Structured Sentencing and Determinate Sen-
tencing on State Incarceration Rates, 1978–2004, 28 JUST. Q. 174, 175–76 (2011) 
(finding that sentencing guidelines produce lower incarceration rates when im-
plemented along with determinate sentencing); see also Thomas B. Marvell & 
Carlisle E. Moody, Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing Parole: The Long-
Term Impacts on Prisons and Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 122 (1996) (“There 
is no apparent relationship between the impact on prisons and the [determinate 
sentencing laws] . . . . On the other hand, the 2 [determinate states] that clearly 
reduced prison populations . . . are the only 2 with sentencing guidelines . . . .”); 
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prison-growth trajectories. Figure 8 divides all states into four 
categories: (1) determinate with guidelines; (2) determinate 
without guidelines; (3) indeterminate with guidelines; and (4) in-
determinate without guidelines. The figure shows the average 
amount of prison-rate growth for each of these four system types 
from 1995 to 2007.84  
Prison-rate growth, in Figure 8 and throughout this Article, 
is measured as the number of prisoners added to a state’s prison 
population over the relevant time period, corrected for popula-
tion. Thus, for example, imagine a state that had a prison rate 
of 75 per 100,000 in 1972, but its rate grew to 375 per 100,000 in 
2007. The change in the state’s prison rate would be measured 
as +300 per 100,000 over the thirty-five-year period.85 
 
William Spelman, Crime, Cash, and Limited Options: Explaining the Prison 
Boom, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 29, 32 tbl.1, 59 (2009) (collecting findings 
of three previous studies, and also finding that presumptive sentencing guide-
lines “reduce prison populations in both the short run and the long run”). There 
is evidence that sentencing guidelines tend to suppress prison-rate growth only 
when they are deliberately designed to further such results. See Thomas B. Mar-
vell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 696, 707 (1995) (“Sentencing guidelines are strongly associated 
with comparatively slow prison population growth whenever the legislature 
charged the sentencing commission to consider prison capacity when establish-
ing presumptive sentence ranges.”); Sean Nicholson-Crotty, The Impact of Sen-
tencing Guidelines on State-Level Sanctions: An Analysis Over Time, 50 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 395, 406–07 (2004) (distinguishing between mandatory sentencing 
guidelines linked to correctional resources and those that are not linked to re-
sources: “the implementation of such guidelines [that were linked to correc-
tional resources] decreased the rate of admissions to state prisons by an average 
of 29.8 inmates per 100,000 population each year” from 1975 to 1998). 
 84. This time period was selected because virtually all states had settled 
into their current sentencing systems by the mid-1990s. When grouping states 
under similar headings for earlier periods, it is necessary to classify states ac-
cording to the types of sentencing system they were using for most of the exam-
ined years. This introduces confounding data for some states. For example, Ar-
izona, Kansas, North Carolina, and Virginia all adopted their current systems 
between 1993 and 1995. It is unhelpful to assign one system-type classification 
to them for the entire prison buildup period. One must settle for the “most-
years” approach. Even with this compromise in classification integrity, the rel-
ative positions of the four system types shown in Figure 8 remain the same 
when data are pooled from 1990 to 2007 or even 1980 to 2007. Figure 9, infra, 
attempts to address the problem of changing system types by tracking the 
prison-growth histories of individual determinate states for the specific time 
periods in which they have used their present systems. 
 85. For a comprehensive discussion of this method, and why it is more use-
ful for policy purposes than a percentage measurement, see Kevin R. Reitz, 
Measuring Changes in Incarceration Rates: Shifts in Carceral Intensity as Felt 
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Sources: WEST & SABOL, supra note 11; UNIV. AT ALBANY, SOURCE-




Figure 8 shows substantial differences across the four sys-
tem types, especially when the “determinate-with-guidelines” 
states, the lowest group, are compared with the “indeterminate-
without-guidelines” states at the high end of the growth chart. 
Even ignoring the use of judicial sentencing guidelines, both de-
terminate groups are in lower prison-rate-growth positions than 
the two types of indeterminate systems. 
We can turn to state-specific analysis by charting the prison-
growth experiences of individual determinate systems against 
national averages for indeterminate states, as shown in Figure 
9. This approach has two advantages over the categorical com-
parisons in Figure 8. First, Figure 9 allows us to look at individ-
ual states in the “determinate” category rather than smoothed-
 
by Communities, 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 36–37 (2019). A percentage meas-
urement of the prison-rate change in the example above would indicate that the 
hypothetical state had prison growth of 400% from 1972 to 2007. 
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out averages. Second, it allows us to chart the experience of in-
dividual states over the full time periods in which they had been 
using their determinate systems—a tailoring of inquiry not 
available when sorting states into four bins as in Figure 8. 
Figure 9 shows that sixteen states moved from indetermi-
nate to determinate prison-release systems at various times dur-
ing the buildup years, with adoption years spreading from 1976 
in Maine to 2000 in Wisconsin. For each of the sixteen states, the 
bar chart shows the amount of prison growth per capita experi-
enced within that state after adoption of its determinate system. 
The prison-rate change for each state is measured up until the 
peak year of the buildup period in 2007. Also, for each of the six-
teen determinate states, the state’s prison-rate growth is com-
pared with the average prison-rate growth among all indetermi-
nate states over the same period. Thus, for the first state, Figure 
9 shows that Maine instituted its determinate prison-release 
system in 1976. The black bar represents the change in Maine’s 
prison rate from that date through 2007 (+91 per 100,000). The 
gray bar shows the average change in prison rates among all in-
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Note: All states had indeterminate sentencing systems before the peri-
ods shown on the chart. 
Sources: LANGAN ET AL., supra note 11; UNIV. OF ALBANY, supra Figure 
8; WEST & SABOL, supra note 11. 
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Figure 9 yields findings that are consistent with Figure 8. 
Thirteen out of sixteen states that abolished their indeterminate 
prison-release systems during the buildup period saw less 
prison-rate growth thereafter than states that had retained their 
systems of indeterminate release. The three exceptions were 
California, Indiana, and Florida, which saw absolute increases 
in their prison rates that were 19%, 5%, and 9% higher, respec-
tively, than the comparison group of indeterminate jurisdictions 
over the same years. Among the thirteen “lower-growth” states 
in Figure 9, many had dramatically less change in their prison 
rates than experienced in indeterminate states. Calculated as 
percentage differences, the range was: -73% prison-rate growth 
(Maine), -69% (North Carolina), -67% (Ohio), -58% (Minnesota), 
-56% (Washington), -47% (Kansas), -37% (New Mexico), -33% 
(Oregon), -22% (Arizona, Virginia, and Wisconsin), -21% (Illi-
nois), and -14% (Delaware). 
To illustrate the magnitude of these differences, the state-
specific observations above can be translated into counterfactual 
projections. For example, if all fifty states had experienced the 
same amount of prison-rate growth as Minnesota in the years 
1980 through 2007, then the 2007 prison rate for all American 
states would have peaked at 262 per 100,000 instead of the ac-
tual high mark of 447 per 100,000. Because there were 1.4 
million people in state prisons at yearend 2007,86 a superimposi-
tion of Minnesota’s prison-rate change onto all states would have 
meant 579,460 fewer people in state prisons. 
Two major conclusions can be offered from the raw historical 
statistics of the Great Prison Buildup, in descending order of 
confidence. First, we can be relatively certain that the abolition 
of parole-release discretion in sixteen states was not one of the 
causes of mass incarceration. As I urged readers many years ago, 
“Don’t blame determinacy” for American prison growth.87 By all 
appearances, determinate sentencing reforms tended to help en-
acting states put the brakes on uncontrolled prison expansion—
almost never attaining a full stop, but slowing things down. 
Second, if we see the Great Prison Buildup as a time in which all 
states came under immense pressure to increase their prison 
populations, it was the indeterminate prison-release states that 
proved least able to resist that pressure. This supports a theory 
 
 86. WEST & SABOL, supra note 11, at 1 tbl.1. 
 87. Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth 
Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787 (2006). 
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that politically-vulnerable parole boards were a weak link in the 
prison policy-making of state systems. 
V.  WHICH PRISON-RELEASE SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOST AND LEAST PRISON-RATE 
GROWTH IN THE POST-BUILDUP PERIOD? 
As Professor Zimring has argued in his forthcoming book, 
The Insidious Momentum of Mass Incarceration, careful study of 
state-by-state experience after the nationwide prison-rate peak 
in 2007 reveals no dramatic trends or consistent patterns.88 We 
have not yet entered an era of significant decarceration. We 
might call the years since 2007 the beginning of the “Post-
Buildup Period.”  
Table 1 below breaks out the amount of prison-rate change 
in each of the fifty states from 2007 to 2017 and ranks the states 
from most prison-rate growth to most prison-rate decline.89 The 
sixteen determinate states are shown in bold characters, with 
the thirty-four indeterminate states in regular font. 
From 2007 to 2017, the (unweighted) average prison rate 
across all states dropped from 429 to 380 per 100,000, roughly 
an 11% decline. During this period, thirty-five states saw de-
creases in their prison-rates while fifteen states had prison-rate 
growth. Among the fifteen still-growing states, four were deter-
minate systems, and the top five were all indeterminate. Among 
the states in the middle of the pack in Table 1, states with dif-
ferent types of systems are all mixed together. It is hard to draw 
conclusions from this jumble.  
Only one suggestive pattern emerges. Among indeterminate 
states, the average change in prison rates was -49 per 100,000 
compared with -23 per 100,000 in determinate states. These are 
not enormous drops for either system type across a full decade. 
(In the 1980s and 1990s, an absolute ten-year change in prison 
rates of 49 per 100,000 would have ranked in the lowest five 
states.) Nonetheless, it is intriguing that indeterminate states 
have had more than twice as much prison-rate decline as deter-
minate states in the post-growth period. This raises the possibil-
ity that the low-friction quality of indeterminate prison-release 
 
 88. ZIMRING, supra note 29 (manuscript ch. 5 at 14–18). 
 89. I use a different measure of prison-rate growth than Professor Zimring, 
which leads to a somewhat different set of statistical conclusions and state-by-
state rankings than in Zimring’s analysis. For a full explanation of my method 
and why I believe it is the best available approach, see Reitz, supra note 85, at 
9–12, 36–37. 
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systems could make it easier to reverse course than in stickier 
determinate regimes. Parole boards are very good at reflecting 
the political pressures brought to bear upon them at any partic-
ular time and can turn the battleship of prison policy without 
waiting for legislatures, sentencing commissions, prosecutors, or 
courts to give them a push. 
 
Table 1. State-by-State Growth in Prison Rates by Rank (Most 
to Least) and by Prison-Rate Change per 100,000 Population, 
2007–2017 (Determinate States in Bold) 
 
Rank State Prison-Rate Change 
1 Arkansas 96 
2 West Virginia 59 
3 South Dakota 40 
4 Oklahoma 39 
5 Wyoming 35 
6 New Mexico 31 
7 Nebraska 30 
8 Missouri 26 
9 Kansas 20 
10 Arizona 15 
11 Kentucky 15 
12 Minnesota 10 
13 Pennsylvania 10 
14 North Dakota 5 
15 Tennessee 5 
16 Ohio -1 
17 Oregon -5 
18 Iowa -6 
19 Montana -6 
20 Wisconsin -6 
21 Washington -11 
22 Maine -14 
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23 New Hampshire -18 
24 North Carolina -20 
25 Illinois -26 
26 Utah -33 
27 Idaho -36 
28 Indiana -37 
29 Nevada -44 
30 Virginia -53 
31 Georgia -57 
32 Delaware -62 
33 Rhode Island -65 
34 Florida -69 
35 New York -73 
36 Vermont -80 
37 Maryland -87 
38 New Jersey -91 
39 Hawaii -98 
40 Michigan -102 
41 Colorado -114 
42 Mississippi -115 
43 Texas -116 
44 Alabama -129 
45 Massachusetts -129 
46 South Carolina -138 
47 Connecticut -142 
48 California -143 
49 Louisiana -146 
50 Alaska -189 
 
Sources: BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 17; WEST & SABOL, supra 
note 11. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article makes a series of modest claims in support of a 
larger argument that is exceedingly important: the changing use 
of prison-release discretion over the past several decades was 
likely one of the important causes of runaway prison expansion 
across the United States—not alone, but among other causal 
forces. No one has done the research that would be needed to 
estimate the degree of responsibility that indeterminate prison-
release systems bear for the advent of mass incarceration. It is 
not clear that many people even regard this as an important 
question. 
Given the possible magnitude of prison-release discretion as 
a causal variable, it merits far more attention than it has re-
ceived. We should be taking a hard look at the prison-growth 
histories of paroling states during the prison buildup. It is possi-
ble such research will confirm that such systems were uniquely 
helpless to resist external pressures to increase the severity of 
prison sentences (see Figures 8 and 9 above). If we care about 
insulating state criminal justice systems from uncontrolled 
prison growth in the future, that would be a critical thing to 
know.  
In addition, we should be studying how indeterminate sys-
tems fare when there are external pressures to reduce prison 
populations. There may be ways to harness and control prison-
release discretion in service of engineered decarceration policy. 
For example, the evidence from the last ten years suggests that 
indeterminate sentencing schemes may be freer to achieve 
meaningful prison-rate drops than the stickier determinate sys-
tems.90 Researchers and policy makers should be exploring 
whether that is indeed the case and how exactly it has been hap-
pening.  
Finally, in addition to asking whether we can redesign 
American prison-release laws and institutions to better support 
planned decarceration in the near future—we should give equal 
concern to equipping indeterminate systems to resist runaway 
prison growth if and when the political environment shifts back 
to a lock-’em-up orientation.91 On a national scale, a failure to 
 
 90. See supra Part V. 
 91. I believe that better use of actuarial risk assessment tools to promote 
more aggressive programs of prison diversion and prison release is a promising 
avenue to pursue, but that is a subject of a different article. See Kevin R. Reitz, 
The Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclusion in American Prison Pol-
icy, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1–2), https:// 
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learn from the history of the Great Prison Buildup would be un-
forgivably negligent.  
The main message of this Article is that we have been ignor-
ing a critical piece of the mass incarceration puzzle and a poten-
tially powerful tool for its remedy. Just as sentencing-guidelines 
reform was an important movement in the 1980s and 1990s, at-
tracting the attention of many researchers and yielding a slate 
of successful reforms, we now require a comparable investment 
in prison-release reform. Unfortunately, nothing of the sort has 
been gathering steam. Prison-release reform is a field that 
awaits recruits, funding, field work, experimentation, and even 
the bare acknowledgment of its significance. Nevertheless, it is 
a field with an upside potential that should not be left on the 
table in the coming years. While the main effect of the sentenc-
ing-guidelines reform era was to design new institutions that 
could resist upward prison growth and even wrest it under con-
trol, the mission for the coming decades is to unwind the excesses 
of mass incarceration across the states—and, importantly, to do 
so in sustainable ways. It is hard to believe we will succeed in 




onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/bsl.2461. For a recommendation that 
risk assessment instruments should be widely used by sentencing courts for 
purposes of prison diversion, see MPCS, supra note 1, § 9.08(3). 
